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INTRODUCTION
Children with disabilities are entitled to a free, appropriate public education
(FAPE), including placement at residential programs when necessary.1 In some
cases, school districts offer such placements. In other cases, parents are forced to
turn to the courts. Families of sufficient means also have the additional option of
funding the placement on their own and seeking reimbursement. When are youth
with mental illness entitled to residential placement through the education system?
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),2 all children
are entitled to a FAPE in a placement that is the least restrictive environment
(LRE).3 This placement is determined through an individualized educational
program (IEP).4 If a child has a disability that prevents him or her from access to
education, then a FAPE consists of the support and services necessary to assist
the child in accessing education along with appropriate placement.5 In cases where
a child’s mental health condition impedes his or her access to education, a FAPE
includes the mental health services the student requires to access education.6
Children with mental illness can present a variety of internalizing or
externalizing behaviors that impact their education.7 Like all other related support
and services in special education, schools must provide mental health services in a
placement that is the LRE.8 “To the maximum extent appropriate,” children with
disabilities should be educated in regular classes with their nondisabled peers in a

1. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2012).
2. Id. § 1400.
3. Id. § 1412(a)(5).
4. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(B)(i).
5. Id. §§ 1401(9), (26), (29), 1412(a)(1)(A).
6. IDEA and its implementing regulations do not use the term mental health services.
Nonetheless, many related services are mental health services. E.g., 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.34(a) (2014)
(related services include psychological services, counseling services, and rehabilitation counseling); id.
§ 300.34(c)(2) (counseling services); id. § 300.34(c)(8) (parent counseling and training); id.
§ 300.34(c)(10) (psychological services); id. § 300.34(c)(14) (social work services); id. § 300.104
(residential placement).
7. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL M ANUAL OF M ENTAL
DISORDERS 13 (5th ed. 2013) (clustering disorders based on internalizing and externalizing factors).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).

2015]

JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO SPECIAL EDUCATION

51

comprehensive school.9 Some children’s behavioral challenges are severe enough
that they must attend intensive day treatment programs while continuing to live at
home.10 But the only way to enable a child with severe mental health challenges to
access his or her education is through an educational placement at a residential
program.11
Broadly speaking, a residential program is a placement at which a child is
placed away from his or her home—whether it is an educational placement is the
core question in most cases.12 In some cases, the student may need to leave his or
her home state to attend school at a residential program,13 while in others the
student is able to—or even entitled to—placement closer to his or her home.14
Every residential program is different,15 and a particular residential program may
not be appropriate for a particular child.16
School districts often resist placing youth at residential programs.17
Residential placements are costly compared to even the most expensive nonpublic
day schools and are among the most restrictive educational placements available.18
9. Id.
10. E.g., Tracy N. ex rel. Nickalas N. v. Dep’t of Educ., Haw., 715 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1114–15
(D. Haw. 2010) (finding a day treatment program appropriate for a large youth with frequent
behavioral outbursts).
11. E.g., Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1 v. B.S. ex rel. A.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1497–98, 1502–03 (9th Cir.
1996) (finding that where the child’s assaultive behavior problems had escalated to the point of the
child’s requiring restraints, a period of hospitalization, and ultimately expulsion from the school’s day
program, such that no educational services were provided for six months, the hearing officer and
district court properly ordered residential placement through an IEP).
12. E.g., id. at 1501 (noting that the child required “intensive, round-the-clock care, in order to
address [a student’s] behavioral disabilities and enable her to benefit from her education”). While
IDEA’s implementing regulations require that parents not be assigned the nonmedical costs,
including room and board, of a residential program when such placement is necessary, 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.104 (2014), neither IDEA nor its implementing regulations define what a residential program
actually is.
13. E.g., Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 82 F.3d at 1496–98 (Washington student parentally placed in a
residential program in Montana).
14. E.g., Todd D. ex rel. Robert D. v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576, 1578–79, 1581–82 (11th Cir.
1991) (holding the district court was incorrect in ordering a Georgia youth to attend a residential
program in Texas when his IEP goals required placement closer to home).
15. E.g., Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 639 (9th
Cir. 1990) (while there was “no dispute that Michelle require[d] a residential placement in order to
receive an appropriate education,” the parents and school district were unable to identify a mutually
agreeable residential program); Clevenger ex rel. Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514, 515–
16 (6th Cir. 1984) (comparing two residential programs to determine which was appropriate).
16. E.g., Eschenasy ex rel. Eschenasy v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 604 F. Supp. 2d 639, 651–52
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that a particular residential program was not appropriate where the child did
not make progress academically and was asked to leave because of behavioral challenges).
17. IDEA refers to local educational agencies. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)(A) (2012). Local
educational agencies can include, inter alia, school districts, county offices of education, and
independently operated charter schools. Id. This Article refers to local educational agencies
collectively as school districts throughout.
18. E.g., Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1086 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that
the objective LRE’s preference for mainstreaming precludes placement in a residential educational
program if the student could access an education in a day program); Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 903 F.2d
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When the student who needs residential placement is in the foster care or youth
probation system, this resistance is often augmented by questions—feigned or
real—of residence and responsibility.19
This Article explores the landscape of cases regarding residential programs.20
It is intended to serve as a practitioner’s guide to understanding application of
IDEA and the right of children with disabilities to a FAPE. First, it briefly
discusses what it means to guarantee a FAPE in the LRE under the requirements
of IDEA, before turning to who is responsible for providing it. Next, it reviews
what IDEA means by “educational benefit,”21 previewing how courts’ frequent
disregard of the statute’s text has led to much of the confusion in the current state
of the law. The Article then explores several key areas of confusion within the law,
with a particular focus on the statute’s “medical exception,” before setting out the
core tests utilized by the various circuit courts of appeals to determine whether
placement at a residential program is appropriate. After this, the Article briefly
discusses unilateral placements by parents and their attempts to seek
reimbursement from the appropriate educational agency.
When read closely, case law regarding residential programs is riddled with
inconsistencies, conflations, and contradictions.22 But when read as a whole, the
body of law is similar if not uniform across circuits so long as appropriate
attention is paid to the semantics of each circuit’s wording of the inquiry—with
the notable exception of the Tenth Circuit. For the most part, cases requesting
residential placement for a FAPE are reliable in unilateral placement cases and
vice versa.
I.

TOMMY

Tommy23 struggled all his life in school despite being in special education
since first grade. He has depression and severe, school-based anxiety, the latter of
which may stem from his intellectual disability that went unidentified until he was
seventeen.24 For a decade, California schools passed Tommy from grade to grade
at 635, 639 (the placement sought by parents in 1985 was $150,000 per year); Residential Treatment
Centers, MD. COAL. FAMILIES FOR CHILDREN’S MENTAL HEALTH, www.mdcoalition.org/
resources/childrens-mental-health/155-residential-treatment-centers (last visited Aug. 25, 2014). In
the author’s experience, yearly costs at various residential programs between 2007 and 2014 have
ranged from $120,000 to $150,000.
19. E.g., Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Educ. v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 668 F.3d 1052, 1053–55 (9th
Cir. 2011) (five years of litigation to determine what agencies were responsible for the educational
placement of a foster youth in a residential program).
20. As originally conceived, this Article focused particularly on residential placements for
court-involved youth.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part V.
23. “Tommy’s” story is based on a former client of the author. Some facts were changed to
maintain confidentiality.
24. Until recently, intellectual disabilities were called “mental retardation.” Compare A M.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL M ANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed.
2000) (mental retardation), with AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 7, at 33 (intellectual disability). In
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and failed to identify his mild-bordering-on-moderate intellectual disability. As he
grew older, he began presenting behavioral challenges as a result of his disabilities.
In sixth grade, he started acting out in class. In seventh grade, he was regularly
being suspended. And in eighth grade, he was expelled from school for a fight.
Tommy did not succeed in comprehensive public schools. His school district
offered placement in a private school that serves only children with disabilities
through his IEP.
But Tommy’s behaviors worsened in severity and frequency over the course
of the first semester. He was increasingly sullen and would rarely speak either at
home or at school. He made no friends and developed no meaningful
relationships with any school staff. Some weeks he sat quietly in the back of the
room doing nothing, while other weeks he swore at teachers and threatened his
classmates. By the spring, he could rarely sleep through an entire night due to
night terrors and experienced anxiety attacks during the school day. He began
skipping school altogether. His private school documented all of these issues and
discussed them with the school district at multiple IEP team meetings, but neither
proposed any services or accommodations to address Tommy’s deteriorating
mental health and its impact on his education. His mother repeatedly asked for
help and finally a mental health evaluation confirmed his severe depression and
anxiety and recommended educational placement in a residential program. The
school district did not act on this recommendation for over four months.
While the school district did nothing, Tommy’s behaviors continued to
escalate. An off-campus altercation led to Tommy’s arrest and detention in a
juvenile hall. A school psychologist at the juvenile hall evaluated Tommy and
identified his intellectual disability and behaviors consistent with diagnoses of
bipolar disorder and anxiety disorder. She confirmed that he needed placement in
a residential program in order to access his education. The county agency
operating the juvenile hall’s school adopted that recommendation at an IEP team
meeting. The director of special education from his home district participated in
that meeting and did not dispute the IEP placement.
The residential placement was made four years after Tommy’s mental health
began to impede his access to an education and nearly a year after a school-based
mental health evaluation recommended residential placement.
Tommy thrived at his residential program. His behaviors first stabilized with
continual prompting. Then he began acquiring positive replacement behaviors and
relied decreasingly on adult prompts. He made academic progress for the first
time since elementary school. But it was several thousand miles from home. The
school district refused to convene IEP team meetings and the county only funded
one trip for his mother to visit him and participate in in-person family counseling

anticipation of this change, Congress accordingly amended IDEA in 2010 to refer to intellectual
disabilities. Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, § 2(b)(2), 124 Stat. 2643, 2643 (2010) (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. 1400 (2012)).
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to help her understand his IEP and his developmental and mental health needs.
Although his emotional functioning improved, due to his cognitive deficits he did
not understand why he was in a locked placement so far from home.
About nine months into placement, his behavior began to deteriorate.
Placement staff suggested that Tommy was ready to step down to a less restrictive
setting closer to home, but that he still would need a residential program to access
an education. His school district now claimed that the juvenile court had placed
Tommy there outside the IEP process, even though their director of special
education had attended the underlying IEP. They disavowed all responsibility and
cynically offered to convene an IEP team meeting to offer him placement as soon
as he returned home but not before. The juvenile court still maintained
jurisdiction and indicated that he would likely be redetained if he returned home
before an appropriate placement was arranged.
Informal attempts to resolve the dispute and bring Tommy home failed.
Counsel filed an administrative due process complaint,25 engaged in extensive
motion practice, and the case finally settled before hearing. The district agreed to
transition Tommy to an unlocked residential program less than twenty miles from
his mother’s home. He completed high school there and enrolled in a vocational
program to build further independence skills.
Tommy is like the dozens of children for whom the author has obtained
residential placement, whose emotional and behavioral needs are ignored until the
only recourse is among the most restrictive and expensive. This Article does not
address the myriad school-based services that should be provided to address a
child’s mental health and behavioral needs prior to reaching the point Tommy did.
Instead, it focuses on the law once a child’s disabling condition reaches that point
of extraordinary impact.
II. IDEA GUARANTEES A FAPE IN THE LRE FOR
ALL CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES
The core guarantee of the IDEA is the right to a free, appropriate public
education in the least restrictive environment—a FAPE in the LRE—through an
individualized educational program (IEP).26 The term “IEP” generally appears in
four different contexts in special education. An IEP can refer to a written
description of a disabled child’s unique program of special education and related
services.27 The IEP is also the specific program that (should) enable the child to

25. IDEA requires states to afford an “impartial due process hearing” process to resolve
disputes between parents and school districts. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f )(1). In the author’s experience, this
is generally referred to as a “due process” hearing or an “administrative due process hearing.” The
hearing process includes the right to counsel, the right to present evidence, and the right to present,
confront, and compel the attendance of witnesses. Id. § 1415(h). Such a hearing is the primary method
for exhausting administrative remedies prior to filing in state or federal court. Id. § 1415(i)(2).
26. Id. § 1401(9).
27. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A).
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access an education. An “IEP team” is a group of stakeholders—parents, teachers,
service providers—who meet to review and modify the IEP as necessary.28 The
“IEP meeting,” or “IEP team meeting,” is the meeting at which the IEP is
developed or modified.29 In most cases, to establish the appropriateness of a
residential program a child must first be evaluated by a school district, found
eligible for special education, and be offered an IEP.
A. Eligibility for Special Education
To determine whether a child is eligible for special education, educational
agencies must identify children who may have disabilities.30 After this, educational
agencies must evaluate such children in all areas of known and suspected
disability.31 Evaluations must then be administered by staff who are both trained
and knowledgeable in evaluating children with disabilities and also capable of
obtaining, integrating, and interpreting existing data.32 IEP teams must then
consider relevant assessment data to create an IEP that meets the full extent of the
student’s academic, developmental, and functional needs.33
Most students who are placed at residential programs are eligible for special
education when they suffer from a “serious emotional disturbance.”34 But there is
no requirement for a particular classification in order to access a residential
program.35 Eligibility for emotional disturbance is based on long-term
functioning36: a single episode does not establish eligibility nor does a brief
remission obviate eligibility.
28. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
29. E.g., id. § 1414(d)(3)(A), (E).
30. Id. § 1412(a)(3). In the author’s experience, though IDEA places the child-find duty on the
state educational agency, in most instances that duty is delegated to the local educational agency.
31. Id. § 1414(b)(3)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(4) (2014).
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.34(c)(10), 304(b)(1), (c)(1)(iv), (c)(6).
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(1), (d)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(1)(ii)–(iv).
34. E.g., Muller ex rel. Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ. of the E. Islip Union Free Sch. Dist.,
145 F.3d 95, 102–03 (2d Cir. 1998); N. v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 138 (D.D.C. 1979). A
serious emotional disturbance is a condition that occurs over a long period, to a marked degree, and
that adversely affects the child’s educational performance. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i). In addition to
those three criteria, a child must exhibit at least one of the following:
 An inability to learn that cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory, or health factors;
 An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and
teachers;
 Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances;
 A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression; or
 A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or school
problems.
Id. § 300.8(c)(4)(i)(A)–(E). A child does not have an emotional disturbance if he or she is “socially
maladjusted” unless it is determined that he or she nonetheless has an emotional disturbance. Id. at
(c)(4)(ii).
35. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(B) (clarifying that the child-find duty does not require
classification by disability so long as every child with a disability is offered the special education and
related services he or she needs to access his or her education).
36. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i).
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A district cannot deny eligibility for special education by focusing only on a
youth’s high functioning at a residential program.37 In a case from the Second
Circuit, Treena Muller was adopted from an orphanage and began exhibiting
behavioral and emotional problems early in life.38 After the third psychiatric
hospitalization in two months, she was discharged to a residential program where
she “responded well, both emotionally and academically.”39 Treena’s school
district evaluated her for the first time three months into this residential
placement.40 The district dismissed Treena’s long history of behavioral and
emotional problems as a mere “tendency for depression.”41 Instead, it focused
solely on her high level of functioning within the residential program and found
her ineligible for special education altogether.42 The Second Circuit found that
Treena’s long history of behavioral and emotional problems “amounted to more
than a mere conduct disorder.”43
A district also cannot deny eligibility by viewing behaviors in isolation.
Treena’s behaviors included “suicide attempts, . . . arson attempts, . . . lies, cutting
classes, failure to complete homework, stealing things, quitting the basketball
team, . . . defiance, poor grades and academic performance.”44 Many of these
behaviors “are not unusual or ‘inappropriate’ by themselves,” but in combination
they established that she exhibited inappropriate behaviors under normal
circumstances.45
B. Determining the Procedural and Substantive Adequacy of an IEP Under Rowley
Courts still apply the following two-pronged test from Rowley to determine
whether school districts provide a FAPE under IDEA46: (1) whether the
respondents complied with the procedures set forth in IDEA, and (2) whether the
37. Muller, 145 F.3d at 103–04.
38. Id. at 98.
39. Id. at 99.
40. Id. at 98–99.
41. Id. at 99.
42. Id. at 99–100.
43. Id. at 103–04.
44. Id. at 104 (quoting the underlying district court decision).
45. Id.
46. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits federally funded programs from
discriminating on the basis of disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012). Public schools comply with section
504 by providing a FAPE through reasonable accommodations to their educational programming.
E.g., Lauren G. ex rel. Scott G. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 906 F. Supp. 2d 375, 387–88 (E.D. Pa.
2012). Generally, courts have found “few differences” between IDEA’s affirmative duty to provide a
FAPE and section 504’s prohibition against discrimination. Id. (quoting and discussing Third Circuit
precedent on the relationship between IDEA and section 504). In the author’s experience, because
IDEA’s procedures are voluminously set out in statute and regulation, many education advocates
exclusively prosecute claims through IDEA. This Article only addresses IDEA, but note that in some
cases, the lack of procedures in section 504 results in greater protection to children with disabilities
than IDEA. Id. at 392–94 (holding that for parents’ failures to comply with procedures, student was
denied a FAPE for one month under IDEA and entitled to no relief, but was denied a FAPE for five
months and entitled to some relief under section 504 for the same conduct).
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IEP was uniquely tailored and reasonably calculated to provide the child with
some educational benefit.47 These prongs are usually referred to as procedural
FAPE and substantive FAPE, respectively.48
Amy Rowley was a Deaf elementary student who had above average
cognitive ability.49 Amy’s parents wanted her school district to provide a sign
language interpreter, but the district instead provided only an FM transmitter
linked to a hearing aid.50 While Amy passed easily from grade to grade and was an
above-average student, she had the potential to do much better.51 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a divided court, held that IDEA does not require IEPs to
maximize the potential of children with disabilities commensurate with the
opportunities afforded to their non-disabled peers, “[r]ather, Congress sought
primarily to identify and evaluate handicapped children, and to provide them with
access to a free public education.”52
A procedural error only results in a denial of a FAPE if it: (1) impedes the
right to a FAPE; (2) significantly impedes parental participation; or (3) causes a
deprivation of educational benefit.53 For example, failure to have a formal written
offer of a FAPE at the beginning of the school year is a procedural violation of
IDEA, but it does not cause a denial of a FAPE if it does not cause harm because
the parents know what the offer is, had already decided to reject it, and received
the written offer just a few days later.54 But a FAPE has been denied when there
was a failure to disclose testing results indicating a diagnosis of autism, because
without knowledge of those results, the child’s parents could not meaningfully
participate in the IEP process.55
In assessing whether an IEP provides a substantive a FAPE, courts engage
in a fact-intensive inquiry, including academic progress, progress toward annual
47. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982).
48. E.g., Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985) (holding that, to
comply with IDEA, local educational agencies “implement the substantive and procedural
requirements of the Act” (citation omitted)).
49. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184.
50. Id. at 184–85.
51. Id. at 185–86.
52. Id. at 200.
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii) (2012). Congress codified the Second Circuit’s three-prong
harmless-error approach when it reauthorized IDEA in 2004. Id. In the immediate wake of Rowley,
Circuits diverged in their interpretation of whether to evaluate procedural FAPE under a strict liability
theory—that a procedural violation alone established a denial of a FAPE—or a harmless-error test.
Compare Hall ex rel. Hall v. Vance Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 635 (4th Cir. 1985) (strict liability
for procedural violations), with Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994–95 (1st Cir.
1990) (applying a three-prong harmless-error test), and W.G. ex rel. R.G. v. Bd of Tr., 960 F.2d 1479,
1484 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying a two prong harmless error test), superseded by statute, 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d)(1)(B), as recognized in Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. M.P. ex rel. M.P., 689 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir.
2012). Though it has been a decade since Congress codified the harmless-error test, in the author’s
experience, some attorneys still occasionally plead procedural violations on a strict-liability theory.
And their clients lose on those claims every time.
54. J.W. ex rel. J.E.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431, 459–61 (9th Cir. 2010).
55. Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 891 (9th Cir. 2001).
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goals, and access to the general curriculum.56 Schools are not required to
maximize educational benefit, but only to offer a “basic floor” of educational
opportunity.57
As described below in Section II.B, courts analyzing residential placements
do not usually engage in this standard FAPE analysis. In unilateral placement
cases, courts often use this analysis in the first prong, evaluating the district’s offer
of a FAPE, but they do not strictly apply it in the second prong analyzing the
appropriateness of the parents’ placement.
C. The Least Restrictive Environment—the Objective and the Subjective
Least restrictive environment (LRE) has two meanings in IDEA. Though
neither the statute nor case law refer to the distinction in this way, the two
meanings are best understood as the objective LRE and the subjective LRE.
The objective LRE refers to the continuum of placements, starting with fulltime placement in a general education program with nondisabled peers—literally
the least restrictive environment—and continuing up to the most restrictive
environments, namely hospitals and institutions.58 Residential programs are not
expressly described on the federal continuum, but are instead separately defined in
the regulations.59 Residential programs fall near or at the most restrictive end of
the LRE continuum.60
The subjective LRE refers to IDEA’s core mandate that children with
disabilities be removed from the general population “only when the nature or
severity of the disability” is such that the child cannot access an education.61
Circuits use one of three tests to determine the subjective LRE. The Fifth Circuit
developed the two-prong Daniel R.R. test,62 which the Second, Third, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits also use.63 The Sixth Circuit developed the three-prong Roncker

56. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200–01.
57. Id. at 215.
58. 34 C.F.R. § 300.115 (2014).
59. Id. § 300.104.
60. See, e.g., Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1086 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that
the objective LRE’s preference for mainstreaming precludes placement in a residential educational
program if the student could access an education in a day program).
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2012).
62. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989).
63. P. ex rel. Mr. & Mrs. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2008)
(adopting the Daniel R.R., 847 F.2d at 1046, test, but incorrectly identifying the Ninth Circuit as
following that test); L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 976 (10th Cir. 2004); Oberti ex
rel. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1993); Greer ex rel. Greer v. Rome City Sch.
Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 696 (11th Cir. 1991), opinion withdrawn, 956 F.2d 1025 (11th Cir. 1992).
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test,64 which the Fourth and Eighth Circuits also use.65 The Ninth Circuit alone
uses its four-prong Rachel H. test.66
This Article does not further discuss the different LRE tests. While
residential placement cases often mention LRE,67 courts do not usually apply an
LRE analysis to determine whether residential placement is appropriate.
D. Related Services
An appropriate education must include mental health services when those
services are necessary for a student to benefit from his or her education.68
Federally mandated educationally related mental-health services, among other
things, include: counseling services by social workers, psychologists, counselors,
and other qualified personnel; medical services for assessment and evaluation;
parent counseling and training; psychological services; planning and case
management; and rehabilitation counseling.69 However, IDEA and its
implementing regulations “clearly convey[ ] that the list of services in § 300.34 is
not exhaustive.”70
E. Non-Medical Residential Programs
Since its enactment in 1975 as the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act, IDEA and its implementing regulations have always required that educational
agencies place children in residential programs when that is required to provide
educational benefit71: if placement in a public or private residential program is
necessary to provide special education and related services to a handicapped child,
64. Roncker ex rel. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
65. DeVries ex rel. DeBlaay v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 878–79 (4th Cir. 1989);
A.W. ex rel. N.W. v. Nw. R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987).
66. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H. ex rel. Holland, 14 F.3d
1398, 1400–01, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994).
67. E.g., Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1086 (1st Cir. 1993); Kruelle v. New
Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 695 (3d Cir. 1981).
68. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A) (2012).
69. 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(c)(2) (2014) (counseling services); id. § 300.34(c)(5) (medical services
for assessment and evaluation); id. § 300.34(c)(8) (parent counseling and training); id. § 300.34
(c)(10)(i–ii) (psychological services); id. § 300.34(c)(10)(v) (planning and case management); id. §
300.34(c)(12) (rehabilitation counseling).
70. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and Preschool Grants
for Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,569 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R.
pts. 300–01) [hereinafter Assistance to States] (responding to comments requesting a clear statement
that the list of related services is not exhaustive).
71. Different authorities cite different starting points for IDEA. For example, Forest Grove Sch.
Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239 (2009), looks to the Education of the Handicapped Act of 1970. From
1965 to 1975, Congress engaged in a series of legislative attempts to address educational access for
children with disabilities culminating in the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. Bd.
of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179–80 (1982) (discussing the early history of federal
special education litigation and legislation). The author follows a majority in pointing to the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 as the genesis of IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1405–06, 1415–20.
That was the first codification that substantially resembles IDEA as it exists today.
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the program, including non-medical care and room and board, must be at no cost
to the parents of the child.72
The only change to that mandate is to place greater emphasis on the person
by updating the reference from “handicapped child” to “child with a disability.”73
But as discussed more in Section VI below, the real question is when residential
placement is necessary to enable a child to access his or her education.
III. COURTS’ APPROACHES TO ACADEMIC AND FUNCTIONAL NEEDS
The core guarantee of IDEA is a FAPE—free, appropriate public education.
But what is an education? Is it just instruction in academic areas like reading,
writing, and arithmetic? The plain language of IDEA is clear: measurement of
educational benefit includes both academic and functional performance. In
developing an IEP, the IEP team “shall consider . . . the academic, developmental,
and functional needs of the child.”74
Following the text of IDEA, special education evaluations must “use a
variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant functional,
developmental, and academic information.”75 Evaluation materials must be
provided and administered in the way “most likely to yield accurate information
on what the child knows and can do academically, developmentally, and
functionally.”76 Reevaluation is warranted whenever “the local educational agency
determines that the educational or related services needs, including improved
academic achievement and functional performance, of the child warrant a
reevaluation.”77 Prior to exiting a child from special education, the local
educational agency must provide the child a summary of his or her “academic
achievement and functional performance.”78 Assistive technology is equipment
“used to increase, maintain, or improve functional capabilities of a child with a
disability.”79 An IEP document must include, among other things: a statement of
“present levels of academic achievement and functional performance”;80 a
statement of annual goals “including academic and functional goals”;81 and a
description of the accommodations needed to “measure the academic
achievement and functional performance.”82
Where Congress intended to limit educational benefit to academic
achievement, it did so specifically. IDEA does not limit educational benefit to
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 692 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 121a.302 (1979)).
45 C.F.R. § 300.104.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A) (2012).
Id. § 1414(b)(2)(A).
Id. § 1414(b)(3)(A)(ii).
Id. § 1414(a)(2)(A)(i).
Id. § 1414(c)(5)(B)(ii).
Id. § 1401(1).
Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I).
Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II).
Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VI)(aa).
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academic achievement.83 Yet courts regularly disregard the plain language of
IDEA, so the definition of educational benefit varies from circuit to circuit (and
sometimes from case to case).84 For example, in the Ninth Circuit, educational
benefit can include academic, social, and behavioral needs among others—
academic achievement tests are “not the sine qua non of ‘educational benefit.’”85
But, when determining whether a residential placement is educational in nature,
“educational” no longer includes “medical, social, or emotional problems . . . quite
apart from the learning process.”86
A. Standards for Reviewing Residential Placements
The most difficult task in carefully parsing cases on residential programs is
that courts conflate several distinctions in their analysis. These distinctions are not
always vital, but courts’ lack of specificity does little to help clarify an already
imprecise inquiry.
Most importantly, courts often interchangeably apply cases involving
disputes over whether a residential placement is necessary for a FAPE with
unilateral placement cases.87 As used in this Article, a FAPE case is one in which
the parent is advocating for the school district to place the child in a residential
program through his or her IEP. The child is not yet in the desired placement and
the core dispute is what educational program is necessary to provide a FAPE. A
unilateral placement case is one in which a parent has withdrawn his or her child
from public programs, placed the child at the parent’s own expense, and then
seeks reimbursement from the educational agency. The child is already in the
desired placement and, while what is necessary for FAPE is at issue, the core
dispute is who will pay.
This cross-referencing is further complicated, as described below in Section
VI, by the Seventh and Fifth Circuits’ articulation of analyses that are nominally
different from the majority approach but do not seem to be substantively much
different than one another. Though placement and related services are two
different things, many courts conflate them when discussing residential

83. Though perhaps one could read the requirement for states to monitor “educational results
and functional outcomes” as such a separation? See id. § 1416(a)(2)(A).
84. See Deal ex rel. Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 855, 861–62, 864 (6th
Cir. 2004); Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 1998); Polk ex rel. Polk v.
Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 179 (2nd Cir. 1988).
85. Seattle Sch. Dist., No.1 v. B.S. ex rel. A.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996).
86. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 643 (9th Cir.
1990).
87. Compare e.g., Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student E.H., 587 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir.
2009) (quoting Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 903 F.2d at 643—a FAPE case—in deciding a unilateral
placement case), with Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Honig, 910 F.2d 627, 628 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing In re
Drew P. v. Clarke Cnty. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 927 (11th Cir. 1989)—a unilateral placement case—in
deciding a FAPE case).
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programs.88 This leads to a second confusion when courts apply “the medical
exception” as if it were a single doctrine as described below in Section IV.
Courts next waver in the target of the medical exception analysis: some
courts look to the purpose89 (i.e., what motivated the placement), where other
courts look into the nature of the service and placement (i.e., what is being
provided and by whom).90 As described below in Section VII, in unilateral cases
courts may look to both. The standard of review at the district and appellate court
levels is another moving target. This Article does not discuss it, but it is a vital
consideration in determining whether to appeal an administrative decision.
These challenges are all layered on IDEA’s necessarily subjective standard
requiring that a child be afforded a FAPE in the LRE. This shifting landscape
does not lend itself to clean categories and tests, regardless of what any given case
professes. The root of these conflations and confusions seems to be a departure
from the statutory text and purpose of IDEA, as described below in Sections V,
VI, and VII. Nonetheless, this nuance also leaves room creatively for the zealous
advocate who understands where there is firm ground in the law and where there
is mush.
IV. THE MEDICAL SERVICES EXEMPTIONS
IDEA provides two similar but distinct relevant medical exceptions.91 The
first medical exception is that “related services” include the medical services of a
physician only for diagnostic and evaluation purposes.92 Any medical services for
any reason other than diagnostic and evaluation purposes are not related services,
and therefore not the responsibility of the school district.93 If a service is medical
(and not for diagnosis or evaluation), the school is completely exempted from
providing it.94
The second medical exception is that educational agencies are responsible
for all “non-medical” costs of residential program placements.95 In comments to
the 2006 regulations, the Department of Education’s Office of Special Education
and Related Services explained that this means that “visits to a doctor for
88. See Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Elizabeth E. ex rel. Roxanne B., 702 F.3d 1227, 1237
(10th Cir. 2012) (“[B]oth courts which purport to adopt and courts which purport to break from the
Third Circuit approach frequently conflate the two statutory provisions.” (citations omitted)).
Elizabeth E. is discussed in detail below.
89. E.g., Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 694 (3d Cir. 1981).
90. E.g., Darlene L. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 568 F. Supp. 1340, 1344 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
91. Additionally, related services do not include provision of surgically implanted devices. 34
C.F.R. § 300.5 (2014).
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(c)(5).
93. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro ex rel. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 890 (1984) (noting the second
issue was whether catheterization “is excluded from this definition [of related services] as a ‘medical
servic[e]’ serving purposes other than diagnosis or evaluation” (second alteration in original) (quoting
20 U.S.C. § 1401(26))).
94. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26).
95. 34 C.F.R. § 300.104.

2015]

JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO SPECIAL EDUCATION

63

treatment of medical conditions are not covered services under Part B of the Act
and parents may be responsible for the cost of the medical care.”96 It was not
written as a complete bar to such placements, but rather as a limitation of certain
services.97
The seminal Supreme Court case on the related services medical exception
determined that catheterization was a related service where it could be performed
by a lay person with minimal training and was necessary to enable the youth to
attend school.98 Amber Tatro was born with spina bifida that, among other
challenges, made her unable to void her bladder without catheterization every
three to four hours.99 “The procedure is a simple one that may be performed in a
few minutes by a layperson with less than an hour’s training. . . . [A]nd Amber
[who was eight at the time of the decision] soon will be able to perform this
procedure herself.”100 In preschool, her school district offered her an IEP but
refused to offer catheterization.101 The Supreme Court set out a twofold inquiry:
(1) Was the service a supportive service? (2) Was the service a medical service for
purposes other than diagnosis and evaluation?102
In finding that catheterization was a supportive service, the Court focused on
IDEA’s purpose of making public schools available to children with disabilities.103
The Court reasoned that services “that permit a child to remain at school during
the day are no less related to the effort to educate than are services that enable the
child to reach, enter, or exit the school.”104
In finding that catheterization was not a medical service, the Court made
three key determinations.105 The Court first determined that the regulatory
definition of medical services as those provided by a physician was reasonable 106
and clarified that this clause exempted only services that must be provided by a
physician.107 Catheterization was comparable to the nursing services provided to
nondisabled students, such as on-site administration of medication.108 The Court
next clarified that the school would not be required to provide a service that could
be performed outside the school day while still enabling the child to attend

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. § 300.104; Assistance to States, supra note 70, at 46,581.
See 34 C.F.R. § 300.104.
Tatro, 468 U.S. at 885, 894.
Id. at 885.
Id.
Id. at 885–86.
Id. at 890.
Id. at 891.
Id.
Id. at 892–93.
Id.
Id. at 894.
Id. at 893–94.

64

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:49

school.109 Finally, the Court noted that the family had sought no equipment from
the school, only the services of qualified personnel.110
A year before Tatro, an Illinois district court upheld a denial authorization for
a facility on the grounds that the proposed placement was “a psychiatric hospital
providing psychiatric services.”111 The plaintiffs urged that psychiatric services
should be considered psychological services, and therefore “related services”
under IDEA.112 But “[p]sychiatrists, in contradistinction to psychologists . . . are
licensed physicians whose services are appropriately designated as medical
treatment.”113 Psychiatric services (as opposed to psychological services) are still
generally considered medical services that are exempted from IDEA.
A month after Tatro, another Illinois district court allowed reimbursement
for psychological services provided by a psychiatrist.114 That court focused on
Tatro’s analysis of whether the service must be provided by a physician—including
a psychiatrist.115 Because the therapy at issue was recommended (but not
provided) by the school and could have been provided by a nonphysician, the
therapy was a related service despite being provided by a psychiatrist, but
reimbursement would be capped at the rate a non-psychiatrist would have
charged.116
Tatro and its early progeny focused on the nature of the service itself. If the
service was not a supportive service—not required to enable the child to attend
school—or needed to be provided by a physician, then it was an excluded medical
service. The service’s purpose was never considered.
V. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATE EDUCATION AGENCIES
State educational agencies are ultimately responsible for ensuring that every
child with a disability has access to a FAPE.117 Generally states ensure availability
of a FAPE by clearly delegating responsibility to local school districts and enabling
those districts to provide a FAPE. But as described below, in limited
circumstances state educational agencies are directly responsible for educating
youth.
A. Consolidating Responsibility
The purpose of including responsibility for residential placements in IDEA
and its implementing regulations was “to assure a single line of responsibility with
109. Id. at 894.
110. Id. at 895.
111. Darlene L. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 568 F. Supp. 1340, 1342 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
112. Id. at 1344.
113. Id.
114. Max M. v. Thompson, 592 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1445 (ordering reimbursement reduced commensurate with rate that would be
charged by a non-psychiatrist mental health professional).
117. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(12) (2012).
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regard to the education” of children with disabilities, and to ensure that “the State
educational agency shall be the responsible agency” at the end of that line.118
When it enacted IDEA, Congress was concerned that “in many States,
responsibility [for services] is divided, depending upon the age of the handicapped
child, sources of funding, and type of services delivered.”119 Congress created this
single line of authority through state departments of education in an effort to
prevent interagency disputes over services:
Without this requirement, there is an abdication of responsibility for the
education of handicapped children. . . . While the Committee understands
that different agencies may, in fact, deliver services, the responsibility
must remain in a central agency overseeing the education of handicapped
children, so that failure to deliver services or the violation of the rights of
handicapped children is squarely the responsibility of one agency.120
Further,
[a] cost-benefit philosophy supported these interlocking goals [of
providing federal support for the education of children with disabilities].
Instead of saddling public agencies and taxpayers with the enormous
expenditures necessary to maintain the handicapped as lifelong
dependents in a minimally acceptable institutionalized existence,
Congress reasoned that the early injection of federal money and provision
of educational services would remove this burden by creating productive
citizens.121
For example, the Orange County Department of Education followed both
the letter and the intent of IDEA in Orange County—discussed below in Section
V.B—by placing the student in a residential facility and maintaining that
placement while disputing responsibility.122 But in the author’s experience, it is
rare for a school district to make such a placement if they have a remotely
plausible argument against responsibility.123 The state education agency is
ultimately responsible for ensuring that a FAPE—including placement at a
residential program when necessary—is available to every child.

118. North v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 139 (D.D.C. 1979) (quoting a comment to
the original regulations to IDEA’s predecessor the EAHCA).
119. S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 24 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1448. See generally
Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 691–93 (3d Cir. 1981) (for history cites).
120. S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 24.
121. Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 691 (citing S. REP. NO. 94-168).
122. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Educ. v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 668 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 2011).
123. Perhaps one reason for this is that California law prohibits school districts from filing for
due process against one another. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7586 (West 2008). The district in this
position can file against the student disclaiming responsibility. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (2012); 34
C.F.R. § 300.507 (2014). But if it has already placed the youth, it must maintain the placement through
the pendency of the proceedings—stay put. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j); 34 C.F.R. § 300.518(a). The author is
aware of no case awarding a district reimbursement for maintaining stay put, even if the district is
ultimately successful on the merits.
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B. Direct Responsibility of the State Educational Agency
The state educational agency becomes directly responsible to provide a
FAPE to a particular child when it either expressly assumes direct responsibility or
fails to ensure that a FAPE is available to all children. States expressly assume
direct responsibility for providing a FAPE in limited circumstances. For example,
the California Department of Education directly operates California Schools for
the Deaf.124 Hawaii, an anomaly, places responsibility for providing a FAPE
directly on the state department of education which acts as both the state
educational agency and the statewide-local educational agency for all students.125
When a state expressly assumes direct responsibility for providing a FAPE, it is in
fact responsible.126
Absent express responsibility, state educational agencies can become directly
responsible for providing a FAPE by their action or inaction. When states fail to
ensure that a FAPE is available to all children, they trigger direct state
responsibility for a FAPE. This broadly occurs in two scenarios: when they do not
clearly delegate responsibility,127 and when a local school district is unable or
unwilling to serve a child with a disability,128 particularly when the state’s actions
or inaction impedes the student’s right to a FAPE.129
Sometimes states fail to clearly delegate responsibility to school districts and
thus become directly responsible for providing a FAPE. For a number of years,
California law did not establish what school district was responsible for foster
youth placed through an IEP at a residential program.130 The student in Orange
County, A.S., is a crossover youth—a foster youth who “crossed over” to the
juvenile delinquency system—whose biological parents’ educational decisionmaking rights had been terminated by a juvenile court.131 He had a foster parent
who continued to hold educational rights even after he stopped living with her in
2004.132 When his 2006 IEP team determined that he required a residential
124. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 59002 (West 2003).
125. Michael P. ex rel. Courtney G. v. Dep’t of Educ., 656 F.3d 1057, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2011).
126. E.g., Parent ex rel. Student v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., Case No. OAH-2012030888, slip op. at
11, ¶ 10 (Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings Apr. 25, 2013), available at www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah
/seho_decisions/2012030888.pdf (finding the California Department of Education “is the
responsible public agency in a due process hearing involving a student attending” a school described
in California Education Code section 59002).
127. Doe ex rel. Gonzalez v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1491–93 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a
court may order a state to provide services directly to a disabled child where a local education agency
has failed to do so), aff’d, Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 329 (1988); Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Educ., 668 F.3d
at 1063 (finding the state responsible for providing a FAPE when California law did not clearly
delineate what district was responsible for a child).
128. 34 C.F.R. § 300.227(a).
129. Todd D. ex rel. Robert D. v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576, 1578 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that
where Georgia law and policy barred the school district from offering an appropriate educational
placement, the state was directly responsible).
130. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Educ., 668 F.3d at 1055, 1057.
131. Id. at 1054.
132. Id.
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placement, the county office of education agreed to fund the placement but
disputed responsibility, forcing A.S. to file for due process against that office, the
state, and two other school districts.133 California law did not clarify what agency
was responsible for A.S. until a 2007 amendment to the California Education
Code—nearly a year and a half after his placement.134 Because California law failed
to delegate responsibility for such students, the California Department of
Education was directly responsible for providing A.S. a FAPE during that time.135
States also become directly responsible for providing a FAPE when a local
school district is unable or unwilling to serve a child with a disability. In the early
1990s, Georgia law and policy effectively barred school districts from offering
placement at in-state residential programs.136 Todd D. was an eighteen-year-old
Georgia youth with schizophrenia and borderline intellectual disability whose
parents declined a proposed placement in Texas, arguing in part that he should be
closer to home to work on his transition goals.137 The district court ruled against
the parents based on the convenience for the state of maintaining its existing
policies.138 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this approach that ignored Todd’s
unique needs.139 The state would be directly responsible to provide Todd a FAPE
if his parents could prove on remand that state policy in fact prevented the district
from serving Todd in a local program.140
Similarly, an Illinois family recently survived a state education agency’s Rule
12(b) motion to dismiss where they had alleged that the state’s refusal to approve
the only placement appropriate for their child denied their child a FAPE. 141 The
plaintiffs credibly alleged that (1) but for the state’s failure to approve the only
appropriate placement, the school district would have placed the child at that
placement; and (2) there was no appropriate placement other than the one sought
in the complaint.142 The court considered this a jurisdictional issue and couched its
order in the language of traceability—whether the plaintiff could establish a causal
link between the state’s action and the alleged harm.143
But families are not always successful linking state action to denials of a

133. Id. at 1054–55.
134. Id. at 1060–63.
135. Id. at 1063 (citing Gadsby ex rel. Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 953 (4th Cir.1997))
(holding that for the time period during which “California law failed to make any school district
responsible for [the student’s] education . . . CDE [was] the agency responsible” for providing a
FAPE).
136. Todd D. ex rel. Robert D. v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576, 1578–79 (11th Cir. 1991).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1581–82.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1583.
141. B.J. ex rel. B.J. v. Homewood Flossmoor CHSD #233, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1095 (N.D.
Ill. 2013).
142. Id. at 1097–98.
143. Id. at 1095–96.
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FAPE.144 At the administrative level, some hearing officers in cases basing a denial
of a FAPE on the state’s failure to approve a program have found that a particular
placement is inappropriate in part because it is not state approved.145 On appeal,
courts then rule that the parent lacks standing to challenge the state’s withholding
of approval because the denial of a FAPE is caused by the hearing officer’s
decision.146 So the parent in this situation cannot win at the hearing because the
hearing officer cannot award the relief they seek. But neither can the parent seek
relief against the state because the denial is nominally caused by the hearing
officer’s decision. This could be an instance in which a direct filing in state or
federal court is appropriate on the grounds that exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be futile.147
The state educational agency may fail to ensure availability of a FAPE when
it fails to resolve interagency disputes.148 Yet generally, states comply with IDEA
by clearly delegating responsibility for providing a FAPE to local educational
agencies—primarily school districts.149
C. Responsibility Based on Students’ Residency Versus Parents’ Residency
Responsibility for providing a FAPE to California students with disabilities
usually follows the student. For students in traditional families, the school district
144. E.g., M.M. ex rel. J.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Waterville Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F. Supp. 185,
189 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
145. As discussed below, state accreditation is not necessary to determine that a program is
appropriate, but it is often a factor in such determinations.
146. In some jurisdictions, a hearing officer’s decision that a placement was inappropriate
prevents plaintiffs from establishing a causal link with the state department of education. M.M., 963 F.
Supp. at 189; Yamen ex rel. Yamen v. Bd. of Educ. of Arlington Sch. Dist., 909 F. Supp. 207, 209–20
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
147. There is growing consensus among the circuits that exhaustion is an affirmative defense
in special education cases, not a jurisdictional bar. See Payne ex rel. D.P. v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653
F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that “the exhaustion requirement in [20 U.S.C.] § 1415(l)
[(2012)] is not jurisdictional”), overruled on other grounds by Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir.
2014) (holding that when exhaustion is raised as an affirmative defense, it should be decided on a
motion for summary judgment, not on an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion); McQueen ex rel.
McQueen v. Colo. Springs Sch. Dist. No. 11, 488 F.3d 868, 873 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), “casts doubt” on any characterization of exhaustion as jurisdictional);
Mosley v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 434 F.3d 527, 532–33 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding the exhaustion
requirement in IDEA is a claims-processing rule).
These cases are based on a recent series of Supreme Court decisions holding that where, as in
IDEA, a federal statute is silent as to whether exhaustion must be pleaded as an element of a claim,
failure to exhaust is not a jurisdictional bar but rather an affirmative defense that must be raised and
proved by the defendant. Jones, 549 U.S. at 212–13 (holding that because Prison Litigation Reform
Act is silent, the usual federal practice of regarding exhaustion as an affirmative defense to be pleaded
and demonstrated must be followed); Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 16 (2005) (reaffirming
the holding of Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004), in which the Court admonished lower courts to
carefully distinguish between jurisdictional and claims-processing rules).
148. See Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 696–98 (3d Cir. 1981)
(discussing the importance of a single line of responsibility to prevent such disputes from causing
denials of service).
149. Id. at 696.
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in which a child resides with his or her parent(s) is responsible for that child’s
education.150 When a youth is detained at a juvenile detention center, the county
office of education in which the detention center is located is responsible
regardless of where the youth came from.151 When a court places a foster youth in
a group home or foster family home, the school district in which that home is
located is responsible for educating the youth.152 If a noneducational public
agency, including a juvenile court, makes a residential placement by itself outside
the IEP process, then that noneducational public agency “shall be responsible for
the residential costs and the cost of noneducation services of the individual,”153
and if that residential placement is located within California, then the school
district in which the placement is located becomes responsible for the child’s
education.154 When a youth is placed in a hospital—including a psychiatric
hospital—the school district in which the hospital is located is responsible.155
There are several key exceptions to this general rule that responsibility
follows the youth. First, California foster youth have the right to remain in their
school of origin when a court-ordered (noneducational) placement would
otherwise force them to change schools;156 the school district of the school of
origin remains responsible for educating that foster youth.157
Second, when a student requires an educational placement in an out-of-state
state residential program, responsibility stays with the district in which the youth’s
parent lives, regardless of the youth’s location.158 This responsibility continues
even after the student turns eighteen.159 But a “parent” for special education
purposes includes a court-appointed education rights holder, such as a courtappointed special advocate.160 The result is that a school district that has never
seen a child can be responsible for offering and funding a residential placement
simply because some good Samaritan volunteered to help a child in need.
Third, when a youth transfers from one California school district to another,
150. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014); id. § 56028 (West 2003 & Supp.
2014); Katz v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 546, 553 (Ct. App.
2004) (holding that Education Code “[s]ection 48200 embodies the general rule that parental
residence dictates a pupil’s proper school district”).
151. EDUC. § 48645.2 (West 2006).
152. Id. § 48204 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014).
153. Id. § 56159 (West 2003).
154. Id. § 48204(a)(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2014).
155. Id. § 56167 (West 2003 & Supp. 2014).
156. Id. § 48853.5(e) (West 2006 & Supp. 2014).
157. Id.
158. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Educ. v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 668 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“We hold as a matter of California law that the California agency responsible for funding a special
education student’s education at an out-of-state residential program is the school district in which the
student’s parent, as defined by California Education Code section 56028, resides.”).
159. EDUC. § 56041 (West 2003) (stating that responsibility stays with the district of the
parent for non-conserved youth and with the district of the conservator for conserved youth); Orange
Cnty. Dep’t of Educ., 668 F.3d at 1058–59 (explaining the application of section 56041).
160. EDUC. § 56028(b) (West 2003 & Supp. 2014).
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during an academic year, while the youth is residentially placed through an IEP,
and the new district does not have a contract with the residential facility, then the
originating special education local plan area is responsible for maintaining the
placement for the remainder of the academic year.161 Generally, when a youth
transfers from one California district to another, the receiving district must offer
comparable services for thirty days and then either adopt the previous IEP or
develop, adopt, and implement a new IEP.162
Fourth, if a noneducational public agency places a child in an out of state
residential facility “without the involvement of the school district . . . in which the
parent or guardian resides,” then that noneducational public agency is fully
responsible for the costs of that placement, including the cost of any special
education.163
The availability of reimbursement for court placements as de facto unilateral
placements is discussed below in Section VII. It is unclear whether these
provisions would be a bar from seeking reimbursement from a school district if
the placement was educationally necessary but made without the involvement of
the district due to the district’s refusal to participate.
D. Interdistrict Transfers
How does a youth transfer districts while physically remaining in a residential
program? Under California law, a youth does not legally “reside” at a residential
program.164 So when the parent(s) move to the jurisdiction of another school
district while the youth is still in placement, the youth has also changed legal
residence, and thus transfers districts. Understanding transfer provisions is
particularly important when representing court-involved youth in residential
placements.
First, when a detained California youth’s IEP team places the youth in a
residential program, the youth likely immediately becomes a transfer student—by
leaving the juvenile detention facility, the youth disenrolls from the juvenile court
school.165 Children with disabilities in the juvenile-delinquency system retain their
right to a FAPE.166 Because the youth never “resided” in the detention facility (for
161. Id. § 56325(c). California local plans are created by special education local plan areas
(SELPAs), which can be large districts or consortia of smaller districts. See id. § 56195.1.
162. Id. § 56325(a).
163. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 7579(d) (West 2008).
164. A California minor’s residence is determined by the parent with whom he or she
maintains his or her abode. Id. § 244(d) (West 2012). The residence of an unmarried minor with a
living parent cannot be changed by that minor’s own act. Id. § 244(e). An adult in California can only
have one residence at a time, and one residence cannot be lost until another is gained. Id. § 244(b)–(c).
Thus, a minor retains his or her parent’s residence because the minor does not maintain an abode in a
residential program and cannot lose his or her parent’s residence absent an affirmative act by the
parent.
165. EDUC. § 48645.1 (West 2008).
166. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(2) (2014) (limited exception to a FAPE for youth aged 18–21
in adult correctional facilities). Youth in adult correctional facilities who were found eligible for special
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the same reasons they do not reside at the residential program), the youth transfers
from the county office of education back to the district in which the “parent”
resides. The county office of education is responsible for maintaining the
placement through the end of the academic year plus extended school year, and
then the home district will be responsible for offering a FAPE.167 It is not clear
how the interplay of the thirty-day transfer provisions and the requirement to have
an IEP in effect at the beginning of a school year affects students in this situation.
Second, whenever a student’s parent changes, then the youth will have
transferred if the new parent lives in a different school district. 168 While most
students do not experience changes of parents, it is common for court-involved
youth, particularly foster youth, to experience such changes of legal parent (for
example, if the natural parents’ rights are terminated or a court-appointed special
advocate resigns).169
In sum, it is undisputed that educational agencies are responsible for
residential placement when it is educationally necessary. And since the inception
of IDEA, courts have struggled to determine when residential placement is
educationally necessary.
VI. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO DETERMINING WHETHER A
RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT IS NECESSARY
Courts apply one of four tests to determine whether a residential placement
is educationally necessary. A majority of circuits inquire whether the placement is
“primarily educationally-based,” looking to whether the child’s educational needs
are severable from his or her social, emotional, and medical needs.170 Nearly two
decades of relatively consistent law among the courts of appeals later, the Seventh
Circuit departed from this approach and instead chose to look to whether the
services are “primarily oriented” toward academics, with what appears to be a
narrow exception allowing functional skills to be considered for children with
moderate to severe developmental disabilities.171 Another decade later, the Fifth
Circuit created a test requiring courts to look at every element of a placement and
“weed out” any unnecessary elements.172 After at least thirty-three years of
litigation on residential placements, the Tenth Circuit took IDEA out of context

education prior to their adult incarceration are entitled to special education and related services, but
do not enjoy the full rights of other youth with disabilities. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 741 F.3d
922, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2014) (under California law, the school district in which the youth legally resides
is responsible for serving youth in adult correctional facilities).
167. EDUC. § 56325(c) (West 2003 & Supp. 2014).
168. GOV’T § 244(d).
169. E.g., Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Educ. v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 668 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir.
2011) (holding that plaintiff’s biological parents’ rights were terminated and assigned to his foster
parent).
170. See infra Part VII.B.
171. See infra Part VI.
172. See id.
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in purporting to take a pure textualist approach.173 As described below, this
approach likely runs afoul of the text of IDEA and its implementing regulations.
Despite inconsistencies, there still exists a large amount of consensus
regarding approaches to residential program and unilateral placement cases.
Residential program cases generally fall into one (or both) of two categories: either
the family is seeking an offer of a FAPE at a residential program, or the family has
unilaterally placed the child and is seeking reimbursement. Unilateral placement
cases are discussed in detail in Section VII below, but briefly, courts apply a
progressive three-prong approach to unilateral placement cases, determining: (1)
whether the educational agency offered a FAPE; (2) if not, whether the parents’
placement was appropriate or proper; and (3) if so, whether equity warrants full,
partial, or no reimbursement.174
The analysis of whether a residential placement is educationally necessary for
the purpose of determining a FAPE is almost identical to the analysis of whether a
unilateral placement is appropriate (prong two). Cases about unilateral placement
cite FAPE cases and FAPE cases cite unilateral placement cases.175 The only
difference in most circuits—discussed in more detail below—is that in a unilateral
placement cases, the placement does not need to comply perfectly with state
educational standards.176 The author has not identified any decision noting that
these are in fact separate types of cases nor one stating that courts nonetheless
generally use the same analysis.
The Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have recently created tests that are
ostensibly for unilateral placements. It is unclear how a residential placement
FAPE case would be analyzed in those circuits, but given the similarity to the
majority approach, it seems likely that the Fifth and Seventh Circuits would apply
their unilateral test to a FAPE case, but the Tenth Circuit’s trajectory is less clear.
A. Kruelle: The Majority Test
The First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of
Columbia Circuits have all adopted the Third Circuit’s Kruelle test, which was
based in part on North, a 1979 District of Columbia district court case.
Ty North was educationally placed in a residential program following an
administrative hearing, but was discharged “because the school could no longer
deal with his emotional and other problems.”177 His parents—who could not
control his behaviors—requested another residential placement, but the school
173. See infra Part VII.B.2.
174. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247–48 (2009).
175. Compare e.g., Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student E.H., 587 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir.
2009) (quoting Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 643 (9th
Cir. 1990)—a FAPE case—in deciding a unilateral placement case), with Taylor v. Honig, 910 F.2d
627, 628 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing In re Drew P. v. Clarke Cnty. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 927 (11th Cir.
1989)—a unilateral placement case—in deciding a FAPE case).
176. See infra Part VIII.
177. North v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 138 (D.D.C. 1979).
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district did nothing.178 When his parents refused to accept him, the residential
placement staff transferred him to the custody of children’s services, which placed
him in a mental health unit at a local hospital, and his parents filed against the
district.179 The school district “vigorously argue[d] that plaintiff’s problems [were]
emotional, social, and otherwise non-educational, and that they should not be
saddled with the responsibility of providing him with living arrangements not
strictly of an educational nature.”180 After hearing testimony, the court found that
Ty’s “needs are so intimately intertwined that realistically it is not possible for the
Court to perform the Solomon-like task of separating them” and awarded a
preliminary injunction ordering the school district to fund residential placement.181
Two years later, the Third Circuit applied similar analysis to determine that
Paul Kruelle was entitled to a residential program in 1981.182 Paul had a profound
intellectual disability with global developmental deficits; for example, he was
unable to feed himself.183 At age ten, Paul was educationally placed in a residential
program, but when his family moved to Delaware his new school district put him
in a day program similar to an environment in which had previously failed him.184
The Third Circuit focused on whether the placement “may be considered
necessary for educational purposes, or whether the residential placement is a
response to medical, social or emotional problems that are segregable from the
learning process.”185 The “inextricability of medical and educational grounds for
certain services,” its unseverability, “is the very basis for holding that the services
are an essential prerequisite for learning.”186
A decade later, the Ninth Circuit in Clovis adopted Kruelle and looked to
whether a youth’s “placement may be considered necessary for educational
purposes, or whether the placement [in a psychiatric facility] is a response to
medical, social, or emotional problems that is necessary quite apart from the
learning process.”187 Everyone agreed that placement at a residential program was
educationally necessary for Michelle, and she was placed in a residential
program.188 Her behaviors deteriorated while she was in a residential program to
the point that she was transferred to a psychiatric hospital. 189 Michelle’s program
was primarily implemented by hospital staff who determined what, if any,

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
1990).
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 141.
Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 693–94 (3d. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 688.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 693.
Id. at 694.
Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 643 (9th Cir.
Id. at 639.
Id.
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educational programming she would receive on a given day.190 The educational
services she received were not provided by the hospital, but by the local school
district, which sent its own teachers in.191 The hospital was under the supervision
of the California Department of Health Services, not the Department of
Education.192 Applying Kruelle, it determined that Michelle’s hospitalization was a
medical placement to address an “‘acute’ psychiatric crisis” rather than an
educational placement.193
While the exact language varies, a majority of circuits use the Third Circuit’s
Kruelle segregability test.194 Unlike the Tatro test for related services focusing on the
nature of the service, the key to the Kruelle inquiry is the purpose of the placement
(though the nature of the placement is a part of that analysis as evidenced by
Clovis). The Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits diverge.
B. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit analyzes whether the “primary orientation” of services is
educational or not.195 Dale M. transferred into his school district at age fourteen,
and “became a serious disciplinary problem.”196 The following year, he was placed
in a therapeutic day school where he only attended twenty days in his first
semester, though he did well when he was present.197 After his arrest and
psychiatric hospitalization, Dale’s mother unilaterally placed him in a residential
program.198
The majority decision found that the residential placement was for the sole
190. Id. at 645.
191. Id. at 646.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 645.
194. E.g., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 284 v. A.C. ex rel. C.C., 258 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 2001)
(“IDEA requires that a state pay for a disabled student’s residential placement if the student, because
of his or her disability, cannot reasonably be anticipated to benefit from instruction without such a
placement.” (citations omitted)); Mrs. B. ex rel. M.M. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1122 (2d
Cir. 1997) (“The fact that a residential placement may be required to alter a child’s regressive behavior
at home as well as within the classroom, or is required due primarily to emotional problems, does not
relieve the state of its obligation to pay for the program under federal law so long as it is necessary to
insure that the child can be properly educated.”); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Ala. State Dep’t of Educ., 915
F.2d 651, 665 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he state must provide personalized instruction with sufficient
support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction.” (citations
omitted)); Burke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Denton ex rel. Denton, 895 F.2d 973, 980 (4th Cir. 1990)
(finding the child’s emotional challenges were “segregable” from his educational challenges where he
performed well when he attended school); McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(quoting Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 693); Clevenger ex rel. Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514,
516 (6th Cir. 1984) (“Richard’s main learning problem is his inability to cooperate with authority.”);
Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[R]esidential placement was essential if
Daniel was to receive the round-the-clock training he needed in order to make any educational
progress.”).
195. Dale M. ex rel. Alice M. v. Bd. of Educ., 237 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir. 2001).
196. Id. at 814.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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purpose of “confinement” to “keep Dale out of jail” after having determined that
the residential placement did not provide “psychological services” to Dale.199 On
the one hand Dale clearly had “psychological problems that interfered with his
obtaining an education,” but because he had “the intelligence to perform” and “no
cognitive defect or disorder such as dyslexia” his problems were “not primarily
educational.”200
A vigorous dissent criticized Judge Posner for mischaracterizing the facts on
record: “the program at Elan involves three separate components, life skills,
counseling and class work. . . . [N]one of us who wear black robes are in an
institutional position to second guess the Illinois Department of Education that
approved the program as a permissible [educational] placement for Illinois school
children.”201 Until residential placement was at issue, the school district agreed
that Dale’s problems were related to his educational progress.202
Thus, Dale M. ignored IDEA and proposed a very narrow view of
educational benefit. If followed faithfully, the Seventh Circuit would likely only
consider academic benefit—progress in reading, writing, math, and other core
academic content—for all children except those with severe to profound
developmental disabilities.203 Despite Judge Posner’s purported departure from
longstanding precedent in other circuits, district courts in the Seventh Circuit
continue to essentially apply the Kruelle standard.204
C. The Fifth Circuit
The leading Fifth Circuit case, Michael Z., was a unilateral placement case and
the Fifth Circuit took care to describe the test it articulated as applying specifically
199. Id. at 817 (“[T]he Elan School does not provide psychological services, at least to Dale.
For him all it provides is confinement. . . . Elan is a jail substitute.”).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 819.
202. Id.
203. See id.
204. E.g., Memorandum Opinion & Order at 8, Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., No.
13-02782, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142134, at *13–14 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2013) (upholding
reimbursement where “drug treatment services they provided W.E. were incidental to, and enabled
him to benefit from, their academic programs”); Report & Recommendation Motions for Summary
Judgment & Sanctions at 14, Mount Vernon Sch. Corp. v. A.M. ex rel. Maier, No. 11-00637, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 122918, at *23, *32–33 (S.D. Ind. Jul. 10, 2012) (magistrate judge quoting discussion of
Kruelle, 642 F.2d 687, in Dale M., 237 F.3d at 817, 818, and applying the “segregable” standard in
recommending upholding an administrative placement at a residential program), adopted by Entry on
Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report & Entry on Case Management, Mount Vernon Sch. Corp. v.
A.M., No. 11-00637, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122915 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 29, 2012); Memorandum
Opinion & Order at 10, Aaron M. ex rel, Glen M. v. Yomtoob, No. 00-07732, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21252, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2003) (explaining that Dale M., 237 F.3d at 813, “merely confirms”
that parents who unilaterally place their children bear the financial risk of that placement in denying a
school district’s request to be reimbursed for expenses that were overturned on appeal). But see
Decision & Order, Hjortness ex rel. Hjortness v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., Nos. 05-00648, 05-00656,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43642 (E.D. Wis. Jun. 27, 2006) (denying reimbursement where procedural
errors did not significantly impede the parents’ participation in the IEP process).
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to unilateral placements.205 In Michael Z., the Fifth Circuit rejected the Kruelle
approach, contending—without referring to IDEA’s extensive provisions
regarding functional needs—that Kruelle “expands school district liability beyond
that required by IDEA.”206 Instead, the Fifth Circuit in Michael Z. set forth a twoprong test asking whether (1) the residential placement was essential in order for
the disabled child to receive a meaningful educational benefit, and (2) it was
primarily oriented toward enabling the child to obtain an education.207
A concurring opinion questioned whether this new test was in fact distinct
from Kruelle.208 “Though linguistically obtuse, Kruelle essentially asks a
straightforward question: Does the child, because of her disability, require a
residential placement to obtain the meaningful benefit to which she is entitled?”209
This test is discussed in detail below in Section VII.B.1. It is unclear whether the
Fifth Circuit would analyze a FAPE residential placement case under its usual
four-prong Michael F. test for FAPE210 or whether it would use the first prong of
its new Michael Z. test. Based on the similarities noted by the concurrence, there
should not be a significant difference in the Fifth Circuit from the majority
approach, but at least one district court has interpreted Michael Z. to impose a very
strict definition of education as academic.211
D. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the approaches discussed above and rejected
them.212 Its analysis focused heavily on the unilateral placement aspect of that
case.213 But because it clearly and forcefully rejected Kruelle’s segregability test, it is
unclear how the Tenth Circuit would now analyze a residential-placement FAPE
case. Of the circuits, the Tenth Circuit is the furthest from the majority. The case
is discussed in detail below.
VII. UNILATERAL PLACEMENT CASES: REQUESTS FOR REIMBURSEMENT
In unilateral placement cases, parents place their child in a private program
without the consent of or referral by their school district and then seek
reimbursement from the district.

205. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z. ex rel. Leah Z., 580 F.3d 286, 298 (5th Cir.
2009).
206. Id. at 299.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 303.
209. Id. at 303 (Prado, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 293–94 (discussing Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F. ex rel. Barry
F., 118 F.3d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1997)).
211. R.C. ex rel. S.K. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 958 F. Supp. 2d 718 (N.D. Tex. 2013),
discussed in Part VII.B.1, infra.
212. See Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Elizabeth E. ex rel. Roxanne B., 702 F.3d 1227, 1232–37
(10th Cir. 2012).
213. Id. at 1235–39.
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Both conceptually and functionally, courts apply the three-prong approach
recently reiterated by the Supreme Court in Forest Grove to unilateral placement
cases, determining: (1) whether the educational agency offered a FAPE; (2) if not,
whether the parents’ placement was appropriate or proper; and (3) if so, whether
equity warrants full, partial, or no reimbursement.214 But in name, courts call this a
two-prong test (whether the district failed to offer a FAPE and whether the
placement is appropriate), after which the equities are balanced.215 Regardless, this
test is consecutive and dispositive. If the educational agency offered a FAPE, the
parent’s claim fails and the inquiry ends.
The right to reimbursement for unilateral placements was initially created by
courts interpreting their statutory authority to “grant such relief as [it] determines
is appropriate” in resolving special education disputes.216 Congress subsequently
created rules relating to the right to reimbursement for unilateral placements,
tacitly endorsing Burlington and its progeny.217
As with residential program law generally, unilateral placement decisions are
not always clear in their analysis. Many cases conflate the first two prongs,
discussing denial of FAPE hand-in-hand with the appropriateness of the parent’s
placement.218 Other cases barely articulate any overall test and instead review
specific elements.219 But these are often important cases, so the author has put
them where they fit best.
Very few families can afford the cost of placement at a residential program,
so unilateral placement as it is most commonly executed—the parent paying out
of pocket—is available only to a narrow portion of the population. But unilateral
placement law is important for all practitioners regardless of the socioeconomic
status of one’s clients because in some cases an agency may seek reimbursement
for a noneducational residential placement from the caregiver of a family. In such

214. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247 (2009).
215. See, e.g., R.L. ex rel. O.L. v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., No 12-14880, 2014 WL 3031231,
at *5 (11th Cir. July 2, 2014) (articulating the relevant test in a unilateral placement case as a two-step
analysis followed by an equitable determination of appropriate relief).
216. Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369–70 (1985) (quoting then-section
1415(e)(2) of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975); see also Florence Cnty. Sch.
Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12–14, (1993) (clarifying that School Committee, 471 U.S.
at 359, does not require parents to follow all of IDEA’s procedures).
217. Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 557 U.S. at 239–45, 247 (discussing IDEA’s 1997 amendments and
their tacit endorsement of School Committee, 471 U.S. at 370, and Carter, 510 U.S. at 7); see also Ralph D.
Mawdsley, Diminished Rights of Parents to Seek Reimbursement Under IDEA for Unilateral Placement of Their
Children in Private Schools, 2012 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 303, 305–11 (2012) (discussing the development of
unilateral placement law).
218. See, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist., No 1 v. B.S. ex rel. A.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1500–02 (9th Cir. 1996).
219. See, e.g., Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student E.H., 587 F.3d 1175, 1183–86 (9th Cir.
2009).
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a case, the family may be able to shift liability to the school district, as the
following families did.220
M.M. was a young woman whose anxiety was so severe that she “would
become overwhelmed by her surroundings, leading to regressive behavior and an
inability ‘to problem solve effectively or to think clearly and logically.’”221 Her
clinical social worker recommended a residential placement, but her school district
refused to offer a residential placement.222 Instead, the district advised M.M.’s
mother to turn her over to the foster-care system.223 While the placement was
pending, M.M.’s father died.224 With no alternative, Mrs. B. gave M.M. over to the
foster-care system to achieve residential placement, but then that system took the
proceeds from the father’s life insurance policy from this new widow to pay for
the placement.225 The Second Circuit affirmed a district court order finding that
M.M.’s placement should have been funded by her school district.226
This is not the only case in which a school district has forced parents to
relinquish their children to foster care because the district refused to pay for a
residential program. In Christopher T., San Francisco Unified School District forced
at least two families to do exactly this.227 Citing Kruelle, the Northern District of
California not only ordered prospective placement for both youth, but it also
ordered the district to reimburse both the parents and the foster care system for
the costs it incurred implementing the placement that should have been provided
by the district.228
A. If the Educational Agency Offered a FAPE, then
Reimbursement is Not Available
Educational agencies enjoy a “safe harbor” from reimbursement claims if
they make “a FAPE available by correctly identifying a child as having a disability
and proposing an IEP adequate to meet the child’s needs.”229 However, “IDEA
does not require [a student] to spend years in an educational environment likely to
be inadequate and to impede her progress simply to permit the School District to
try every option short of residential placement.”230 This prong of analysis
220. E.g., E.M. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 461 (2d Cir. 2014) (concluding that
a parent who has not yet paid for the unilateral placement has standing because of a contractual
obligation to pay tuition).
221. Mrs. B. ex rel. M.M. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1117 (2d Cir. 1997).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1117–18.
225. Id. at 1118.
226. Id. at 1122.
227. Christopher T. ex rel. Brogna v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 553 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (N.D.
Cal. 1982).
228. Id. at 1120–21.
229. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 241 (2009).
230. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1 v. B.S. ex rel. A.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1501 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted).

2015]

JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO SPECIAL EDUCATION

79

essentially applies Rowley’s examination of substantive and procedural compliance
to the district’s offer of a FAPE.
First, an educational agency must meet its child-find duty to identify, locate,
and evaluate the child for special education regardless of whether the child has
previously attended public schools.231 Merely having child-find procedures in place
is not sufficient when a local educational agency “unreasonably fail[s] to identify a
child with disabilities” because Congress placed “paramount importance [on]
properly identifying each child eligible for services.”232
Next, an educational agency must timely complete its evaluations.233 The
school district in Tice conceded that it failed to timely assess Matthew and the
Fourth Circuit found that the “six-month delay directly resulted in there being no
IEP in place at the time of” the unilateral placement.234 If the educational agency
is prevented from completing evaluations, however, relief may be denied under
the equities analysis discussed below.235
The educational agency must find the child eligible for special education. 236
But if a child is not in fact eligible for special education, then an educational
agency’s failure to find, identify, and evaluate the child does not deny that child a
FAPE and the inquiry ends.237
After evaluating and determining eligibility, the educational agency then must
make an offer of a FAPE.238 This offer must be procedurally correct.239 In
refusing to consider a school district’s “post hoc rationalization,” the Fourth
Circuit in Tice declared that where no IEP was offered, “no professional decision
had been made to which deference was due.”240 Without clearly discussing the
231. Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 557 U.S. at 245; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2012) (stating
that the child-find requirement extends to “[a]ll children with disabilities residing in the State,
including children with disabilities . . . attending private schools”).
232. Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 557 U.S. at 245.
233. See Tice ex rel. Tice v. Botetourt Cnty. Sch. Bd., 908 F.2d 1200, 1206–07 (4th Cir. 1990).
234. Id. While the express holding of Tice, applying a strict liability standard to a procedural
error, has been superseded by statute, Tice remains reliable because the Fourth Circuit discussed how
the delay in assessment resulted in the child not being served, which is similar to the “impede the
right to a FAPE” prong of the current harmless error test.
235. See, e.g., Patricia P. ex rel. Jacob P. v. Bd. of Educ., 203 F.3d 462, 469 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“[P]arents who . . . do not allow a school district a reasonable opportunity to evaluate their disabled
child, forfeit their claim for reimbursement . . . .” (citations omitted)).
236. See Muller ex rel. Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ., 145 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 1998)
(explaining that whether a student is disabled such that he or she is eligible for special education
under IDEA is “determined by the individual school district in accordance with state law”).
237. See Maus ex rel. K.M. v. Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 688 F. Supp. 2d 282, 294–98
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that a student with social disabilities that did not impair her educational
performance was not eligible for special education services under IDEA and thus procedural
violations by the district’s committee on special education did not deny her a FAPE).
238. See Tice, 908 F.2d at 1208 (finding that a school district’s failure to provide timely
evaluations of a child identified as disabled was a procedural error that amounted to a failure to
provide the child a FAPE as required by IDEA).
239. Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The Supreme Court has
explained the great importance of . . . procedural components of IDEA.”).
240. Tice, 908 F.2d at 1208.
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underlying facts, the Ninth Circuit in Union similarly emphasized the importance
of the written offer because the purpose of prior written notice requirement is “to
eliminate troublesome factual disputes many years later about when placements
were offered, what placements were offered, and what additional” services were
offered.241 Failure to make a written offer prevents the parents from being able to
make a decision whether to accept or oppose the offer.242 In sum, “a school
district’s failure to propose an IEP of any kind is at least as serious” a failure to
offer an appropriate IEP.243
The purported offer of a FAPE must address the known needs of a child.244
In Seattle, the Ninth Circuit considered a former foster youth with a long history of
emotional and behavior challenges, including diagnosed attachment disorder and a
personality disorder.245 Though she was “exceptionally bright,” she was
“deteriorating” academically “unable to make productive use of what she
learned.”246 The school district evaluated her when she was eight, but found her
ineligible for special education.247 She was so disruptive to her peers that “the
School District had even expelled her” when she was just ten.248 The district
reevaluated her five months after expelling her and found her eligible, but
recommended a school-based program despite a number of clinicians
recommending residential placement.249 The Ninth Circuit ordered the school to
fund a residential program, holding that the educational agency was not allowed to
keep her in an inadequate environment simply “to try every option short of
residential placement.”250
Similarly in Mrs. B., the child had anxiety such that she “would become
overwhelmed by her surroundings, leading to regressive behavior and an inability
‘to problem solve effectively or to think clearly and logically.’”251 Even her
teachers remarked that the child was “not producing or learning in our
program.”252 She failed to meet “nearly all” of her IEP objectives and “over the
course of three years, despite being of average to slightly below-average
241. Union Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d at 1526.
242. Id. The Union School District case, like the Fourth Circuit’s 1990 decision in Tice, appears at
a glance to provide a strict error analysis to procedural FAPE claims, even though the Ninth Circuit
had two years earlier shifted toward a harmless error test in W.G. ex rel. R.G. v. Board of Trustees, 960
F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, Union School District is likely reliable on this point because
although it does not expressly articulate harm, it discusses how the failure to make a formal written
offer prevents the parents from participating in the IEP process. Union Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d at 1526.
243. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 238–39 (2009).
244. Mrs. B. ex rel. M.M. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1115–16 (2d Cir. 1997).
245. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1 v. B.S. ex rel. A.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1497–98 (9th Cir. 1996).
246. Id. at 1500–01.
247. Id. at 1497.
248. Id. at 1500.
249. Id. at 1497–98.
250. Id. at 1501.
251. Mrs. B., 103 F.3d at 1117 (quoting the child’s psychological report from the Yale Child
Study Center).
252. Id. at 1117.
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intelligence, [she] did not advance more than one grade level in any subject.”253
The school district denied her a FAPE when it knew her emotional and behavioral
challenges were impeding her ability to access an education, but “offered no plan
to deal with her worsening behavior.”254
When a child has already attended the school’s placement or a similar
placement, the court should look to actual progress in that environment.255 The
court should examine both the academic and nonacademic educational benefit—
or lack thereof—from the proposed placement.256 This FAPE analysis of actual
progress accords with common substantive FAPE analysis in which courts
sometimes limit their inquiry about the offer to what was known at the time of the
IEP team meeting.257 If the educational agency failed to offer a FAPE, the court
moves on to consider the appropriateness of the parent’s unilateral placement.
B. Appropriateness of the Placement
As discussed above, the analysis of whether a residential placement is
educationally necessary for the purpose of determining a FAPE is the same in
most circuits as the analysis of whether a parent’s unilateral placement is
appropriate (prong two).258 The key difference is that a unilateral placement does
not have to comport with all of the requirements of IDEA.259 In Carter, the
Supreme Court expressly stated that a unilateral placement does not have to be
certified by the state educational agency.260 “IDEA was intended to ensure that
children with disabilities receive an education that is both appropriate and free”; to
deny children a free appropriate education because their parents did not follow the
same procedures prescribed for school districts “would defeat this statutory
purpose.”261 State educational agency certification is regularly a factor considered
in determining appropriateness.262

253. Id. at 1121.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1120–21; Seattle Sch. Dist., 82 F.3d at 1500 (applying Sacramento City Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Rachel H. ex rel. Holland, 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994)).
256. Seattle Sch. Dist., 82 F.3d at 1500.
257. Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n IEP must take into
account what was, and was not, objectively reasonable when the snapshot was taken, that is, at the
time the IEP was drafted.” (quoting Fuhrmann ex rel. Fuhrmann v. E. Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993
F.2d 1031, 1041 (3d Cir. 1993))).
258. Compare Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Honig, 910 F.2d 627, 628 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing a
unilateral placement case to decide a FAPE case), with Ashland Sch Dist. v. Parents of Student E.H.,
587 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing a FAPE case to decide a unilateral placement case); compare
Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 697 (3d Cir. 1981) (non-unilateral), with Mary T.
v. Sch. Dist., 575 F.3d 235, 246–48 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 690–92, in a unilateral
placement case).
259. Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 14 (1993).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 13.
262. See, e.g., Manchester-Essex Reg’l Sch. Comm. v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals of
Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 2d 49, 54 (D. Mass 2007).
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Both the Second and Ninth Circuits have recently confirmed that for
reimbursement “parents need not show that a private placement furnishes every special service
necessary to maximize their child’s potential.”263 But the Tenth Circuit ignores the
Supreme Court on this point and requires that the placement be state certified as
described below.264 If the educational agency failed to offer a FAPE and the
parent’s unilateral placement is appropriate, then most circuits move on to
consider the equities. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits are exceptions.
1.

The Fifth Circuit

The Fifth Circuit ostensibly departs from Kruelle, though it is not yet clear to
what extent that departure is meaningful. Shortly after Forest Grove, the Fifth
Circuit set forth a two-prong test to determine whether a unilateral residential
placement is appropriate, asking whether (1) the residential placement was
essential in order for the disabled child to receive a meaningful educational
benefit, and (2) it was primarily oriented toward enabling the child to obtain an
education.265 Even if the parent survives this inquiry, the court is then to “weed
out inappropriate treatments from the appropriate (and therefore reimburseable)
ones.”266
Leah Z. was a young woman with multiple mental and developmental
disabilities whose chief behavior problem in high school was frequently leaving
class during which time she would engage in a variety of maladaptive behaviors. 267
In the middle of ninth grade, her school district transferred her to another school,
but the teacher assigned to that class was on parenting leave and the district hired
an uncertified teacher to staff the class who they failed to inform of Leah’s
primary issue of fleeing class.268 After just two weeks in this classroom, she
became so violent at home that her psychiatrist recommended admission to a
residential program and the parents promptly placed her in it.269 Two months into
this placement, the school district held an IEP team meeting at which it refused to
offer residential placement and instead offered essentially the same program that
had already failed Leah.270
In examining Kruelle and its progeny, the Fifth Circuit expressed concern—
echoing North from thirty years prior—that “[b]y requiring courts to undertake the
Solomonic task of determining when a child’s medical, social, and emotional
263. C.B. ex rel. Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 635 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir.
2011) (quoting Frank G. ex rel. Anthony G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 356 (2d Cir. 2006)); Frank
G., 459 F.3d at 365 (citing M.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2000)).
264. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Elizabeth E. ex rel. Roxanne B., 702 F.3d 1227, 1238–39
(10th Cir. 2012).
265. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z. ex rel. Leah Z., 580 F.3d 286, 300 (2009).
266. Id. at 301.
267. Id. at 289–90.
268. Id. at 290.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 291.
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problems are segregable from education, Kruelle expands school district liability
beyond that required by IDEA.”271 The Fifth Circuit found that the IEP was
clearly inappropriate.272 Applying its new test, the district court’s findings below
established that residential placement was essential for Leah to receive educational
benefit but the Fifth Circuit remanded for findings on whether the placement was
primarily educationally oriented.273 In a concurring opinion, Judge Edward Prado
did “not interpret our two-part test for the propriety of a residential placement as
departing from that of the other circuits that have addressed this issue.”274 He
noted that while the Fifth Circuit’s second prong is not expressly in the Kruelle test,
courts applying Kruelle “have instead gone on to determine whether the particular
placement for which the parents are asking to be reimbursed is itself proper.”275
At least one district court in the Fifth Circuit has followed Michael Z.’s dicta
regarding the limiting liability of districts for only academic services.276 R.C. was a
high school student with varying diagnoses, including bipolar disorder, anxiety
disorder, ADHD, and Asperger’s syndrome.277 R.C. was absent for much of the
second semester of eleventh grade due to school-based anxiety causing him to fail
several classes.278 He was placed in a residential program for approximately four
months, returned home briefly, and then was unilaterally placed at a second
residential program after which his parents requested reimbursement.279 A district
court judge felt that R.C.’s parents’ representation that he had failed eleventh
grade was “misleading” because of R.C.’s “excessive absence” from school that
year.280 While the court was “concerned about plaintiff’s having to be admitted to
residential facilities and psychiatric programs, . . . the core of the IDEA is to
provide access to educational opportunities.”281 Because R.C. was successful when
he was able to attend school, the court disregarded his allegation that he was
unable to attend school for significant periods of time due to his disability.282 The
court ignored the core argument that R.C.’s anxiety prevented him from accessing
educational opportunities.
After conducting an “analysis of the services as a whole,” but before
balancing the equities, courts “must then examine each constituent part of the
placement to weed out inappropriate treatments from the appropriate (and

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
2013).
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id. at 299.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 303.
R.C. ex rel. S.K. & D.H. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 958 F. Supp. 2d 718 (N.D. Tex.
Id. at 723–24.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 728–29.
Id. at 736.
Id.
Id.
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therefore reimburseable) ones.”283 Because Michael Z. was remanded and no
published opinion has applied this aspect of the test, it is unclear how this weeding
out would be applied and how it interacts with the Fifth Circuit’s concern over the
difficulty of the “Solomonic task” of disaggregating services that are essential for
education from those that are not. It may operate similar to Tatro—looking to the
nature of the services themselves (whereas the focus of the first part of the Michael
Z. analysis is the purpose of the placement).
2.

The Tenth Circuit

The Tenth Circuit in Jefferson recently reviewed the varying approaches to
appropriateness described in Section VI and invented its own test. 284 Applying a
selective reading of IDEA, the Tenth Circuit analyzes whether (1) the school
district provided a FAPE, (2) the residential placement is accredited in its state, (3)
the residential placement provided specially designed instruction to meet the
unique needs of the child, and (4) any additional services are related services
intended to support education.285 This Jefferson four-prong test takes the place of
the first and second prongs of the Burlington-Forest Grove test to determine the
appropriateness of a parent’s choice of residential placement in unilateral
placement cases.286
Elizabeth E. was attending a private day school for children with disabilities
pursuant to a settlement agreement when she was psychiatrically hospitalized for
assessment purposes.287 The school district had a separate agreement with the
private school that the school would refund the school district for days Elizabeth
did not attend.288 But the district withdrew Elizabeth from the private school
because she was in the hospital.289 The school district then asserted that Elizabeth
was no longer even a student of the school district—allegedly mooting the
settlement agreement.290 The parents informed the school district that they were
transitioning Elizabeth to a residential program out of state and requested an IEP
team meeting to discuss the change.291 The school district refused to engage in any
meaningful discussion.292 The parents filed for due process, requesting that the
school district fund a residential program for Elizabeth and at every level—
283. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z. ex rel. Leah Z., 580 F.3d 286, 301 (5th Cir.
2009).
284. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Elizabeth E. ex rel. Roxanne B., 702 F.3d 1227, 1236–38
(10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013). In its unsuccessful petition for certiorari, Jefferson
County School District argued that this test was actually more favorable for parents. Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, 2012 U.S. Briefs 1175, at 11 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2013), 2013 WL 1247971, at *11.
285. Elizabeth E., 702 F.3d at 1236–37.
286. Id. at 1232–33.
287. Id. at 1230.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1230–31.
291. Id. at 1231.
292. See id.
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administrative, district court, and court of appeals—the school district only
challenged the appropriateness of Elizabeth’s placement, conceding its denial of a
FAPE.293
While it appears to have achieved the correct result for Elizabeth E., the
Tenth Circuit’s new approach is problematic on at least two levels. First, Jefferson’s
second prong goes against two decades of precedent that parents need not meet
IDEA’s procedural requirements such as accreditation,294 despite the Supreme
Court’s recent affirmation that Carter is still good law,295 and current regulations
confirming that.296 Second, Jefferson’s fourth prong may also go awry of Carter
inasmuch as it requires parents to exercise a level of expertise in determining what
services are educationally necessary. That expertise is supposed to be provided by
the school district in the first instance: “[t]his is IDEA’s mandate, and school
officials who conform to it need not worry about reimbursement claims.”297 When
their child is denied a FAPE and parents place him or her in a substantively
appropriate placement at their own expense, “it would be an empty victory to
have a court tell them several years later that they were right but that these
expenditures could not in a proper case be reimbursed by the school officials.”298
Jefferson has not yet been applied within the Tenth Circuit, so it remains to be
seen what actual impact this will have on families.299
C. Balancing the Equities
An undercurrent of equity flows through the entire body of reimbursement
cases. In 1985, Burlington started from the question of whether parents should be
reimbursed when they avoided the IEP process.300 In 1993, Carter laid this out
even more clearly, noting that under IDEA “[c]ourts fashioning discretionary
equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the
appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required.”301
Then in its 1997 reauthorization of IDEA, when Congress codified the
authority for reimbursement, it also included equitable considerations.302 First,

293. Id. at 1231–32.
294. Compare id. at 1237, with Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7,
14 (1993) (“Parents’ failure to select a program known to be approved by the State in favor of an
unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement.”).
295. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247 (2009).
296. 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c) (2014).
297. Carter, 510 U.S. at 14.
298. Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369–70 (1985).
299. Only one case to date cites Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1 for a general proposition. M.S. ex
rel. J.S. v. Utah Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, No. 2:13-cv-420 TS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118942, at *8,
n.9 (D. Utah Aug. 25, 2014) (quoting Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 702 F.3d at 1229) (“IDEA provides
federal funding to states to assist with the education of disabled children on the condition that states
comply with the Act’s ‘extensive goals and procedures.’”).
300. Sch. Comm., 471 U.S. at 372.
301. Carter, 510 U.S. at 16.
302. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii–iv) (2012).
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Congress allowed reduction or denial of reimbursement when a parent either (1)
failed to state their concerns that the IEP team meeting prior to removal or (2)
failed to provide written notice ten business days in advance.303 In 2009, Forest
Grove reiterated that courts may broadly exercise “discretion to reduce the amount
of a reimbursement award if the equities so warrant.”304 Courts exercise this
“broad discretion” to achieve different results under similar circumstances.305
Failure to present a child for evaluation will generally bar reimbursement. 306
Patricia P. placed her son in a parochial school for his first year of high school. 307
When he was not allowed to return she nominally enrolled him in her local school
but within two weeks unilaterally placed him in an out-of-state residential program
with no notice.308 She filed for administrative due process, seeking reimbursement
less than six weeks later.309 Over the next three years, her “sole action evidencing a
willingness to avail her son for evaluation . . . was her offering to allow School
District staff to travel [from Illinois] to Maine to evaluate” him at the residential
program.310 The Seventh Circuit denied reimbursement on the equities because
Patricia P. failed to make a “genuine” effort to give the district a “reasonable
opportunity” to evaluate her son.311 But it cautioned that school districts would be
held to the same standard: “this Court will look harshly upon any party’s failure to
reasonably cooperate with another’s diligent” attempts to comply with IDEA.312
But a New York district court found “no showing that [the parents] acted
unreasonably” in a similar case where the parents did not bring their residentially
placed child back in state to proffer him for evaluation.313 The Eschanasys first
requested a special education evaluation in the spring of their son’s eleventh grade
year, but then unilaterally placed him in a residential program before the district
could complete its evaluation.314 For over three months, the school district
requested the parents either to present their son for evaluation or at least provide
copies of the evaluations conducted at the residential program;315 the parents did
not.316 After finding that he was substantively denied a FAPE317 and that one of
303. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii).
304. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247 (2009).
305. See id. at 238.
306. Patricia P. ex rel. Jacob P. v. Bd. of Educ., 203 F.3d 462, 469 (7th Cir. 2000).
307. Id. at 465.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 469.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Eschenasy ex rel. Eschenasy v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 604 F. Supp. 2d 639, 644–45, 653
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
314. Id. at 645.
315. Id. at 644–45.
316. Id. at 645.
317. The Court did find that the parents’ conduct barred their procedural claim: the school
did not procedurally deny a FAPE for its failure to assess because the parents neither consented to
the evaluation nor presented the child for evaluation. Id.
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the unilateral placements was appropriate, the court found “no showing [that the
parents] acted unreasonably under the circumstances” and awarded full
reimbursement for the appropriate placement.318
Still there are some general guidelines for evaluating equities beyond the
importance of presenting the child for evaluation. Though not required, parents
should provide written notice or state their concerns at an IEP team meeting prior
to unilaterally placing their child per the plain language of IDEA.319 When filling
out application papers to a placement, they should carefully, clearly, and
voluminously express their educational concerns.320 Parents should act before sex
and drugs become a concern—in an appeal of the remand from Forest Grove, the
Ninth Circuit used such evidence in the equities phase to deny reimbursement
even though the child was denied a FAPE and the placement was appropriate.321
Parents should be prepared to prove that school district officials have acted
unreasonably to overcome the presumption in some circuits that school officials
“are properly performing their obligations under IDEA.”322 On the other hand,
parents must be mindful of their own subjective reasons for requesting residential
placement: in a subsequent appeal in Forest Grove, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
“contention that, as a matter of law, his parents’ subjective reasons for private
school enrollment cannot be a valid equitable consideration.”323
Further, if a district has provided English-speaking, literate parents with a
generic statement of parental rights that contains notice of their right to seek
reimbursement, the parents cannot rely on the district’s failure to specifically
notify them of this right.324
Essentially, if the district is perceived as trying at all to work with the parents,
the parents must prove their own good-faith attempt to cooperate.325 While the
overwhelming majority of cases seriously considering the equities go at least in
part against the parents, courts do occasionally find against a school district, even
where the parent is arguably partially to blame.326
VIII. COMMONALITIES AMONG THE CIRCUIT TESTS
Of course, whenever possible, advocacy for youth with mental illness should
start well before the child needs a residential program. In most of the residential
318. Id. at 652–53.
319. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) (2012).
320. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 638 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2012).
321. See id. at 1241.
322. See, e.g., Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247 (2008).
323. Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 638 F.3d at 1238.
324. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv); Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student E.H., 587 F.3d
1175, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2009).
325. Patricia P. ex rel. Jacob P. v. Bd. of Educ., 203 F.3d 462, 469 (7th Cir. 2000); see also
Ashland, 587 F.3d at 1186.
326. E.g., Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Elizabeth E. ex rel. Roxanne B., 702 F.3d 1227,
1242 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding the school district’s failure to notify parents of its intent to evaluate
excused the parents’ failure to present the child for evaluation).
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placement cases in which parents won, the child’s mental illness had been
unaddressed or underaddressed for years. The author’s own experience is that
early and intensive interventions can often prevent the need for residential
placement. But attorneys do not always meet our clients in time to engage in early
advocacy.
When read as a whole, the circuits—except the Tenth Circuit—apply similar
analyses to residential placement cases. Though the wording changes, the majority
look to whether the purpose of the placement is educational—necessary, primarily
educational, insegregably educational, essential for educational purposes, primarily
oriented toward enabling education. The careful attorney will be mindful,
however, to articulate the nuanced differences when citing cross circuit authority
to link facts to their home circuit’s test.
For the most part cases requesting residential placement for a FAPE are
reliable in unilateral placement cases and vice versa. In all but the Tenth Circuit,
the analysis for appropriateness in FAPE cases is identical to the analysis of
appropriateness for unilateral placement cases under the second prong of Forest
Grove.
The key challenge in residential placement cases is establishing the ongoing
link between a child’s mental illness and the child’s inability to access an
education, especially when the symptoms prevent them from consistently
attending school. IDEA was established to give all children with disabilities access
to an education. Congress sought to ensure access to those children whose
disabilities were so severe that they were unable or not allowed to attend school.
In most circuits, children with developmental disabilities should still have
access to residential placements when necessary. But as the circuits move further
away from IDEA’s combined focus on academic and functional performance and
increasingly impose their own ideas of what education is, it has become more
difficult to obtain residential placement for youth with mental illness.

